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ABSTRACT 
Lee (4) investigates possibilities where pollutants may be stored 
for a period of time and later released into the envirorunent when 
adverse effects are minimal. The treatment and storage of pollutants 
before their release into the envirorunent is a crucial part of many 
abatement programs. Surprisingly, emission charges will not induce 
optimal abatement when storage is possible. This occurs because the 
firms' response to the dynamic tax is indeterminant. We suggest alter­
native controls, whereby rights to emit pollutants are sold competi­
tively and demonstrate that markets provide incentives for the optimal 
generation-storage-emission of pollution by firms. In deriving this 
result an important difference between markets and taxes is revealed. 
With markets there is still indeterminacy at the firm level, but the 
aggregate response of all firms is dictated by market forces that 
insure pollution is reduced by some desired amount. 
INTRODUCTION 
MARKETS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
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In considering the decentralized control of pollution and 
other external diseconomies, one usually regards the use of Pigouvian 
effluent taxes or the implementation of a pollution rights market as 
being roughly equivalent. While the systems differ in administrative 
details, they both attempt to internalize the external effects of a 
firm's activities by charging for the marginal costs of pollution 
either through taxes or pollution rights prices. 
In this paper we observe an important potential difference 
between taxes and markets for pollution control. We examine an 
instance where taxes won't work to reduce pollution because the firms' 
reactions to the tax is indeterminant. In the same instance, however, 
if pollution rights are allocated through a market, (as described by 
Dales [1968]) optimal control is achieved. There is still indetermi­
nacy at the firm level, but the aggregate response of all firms is 
dictated by market forces that insure pollution is reduced by some 
desired amount. 
The instance of tax failure to control pollution we examine 
is borrowed from a recent article by Lee [4] appearing in this journal. 
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Lee investigates possibilities where pollutants may be stored for a 
period of time and later released into the environment when adverse 
effects are minimal. The analysis is significant because of the 
practical importance of storage possibilities and because pollution 
models with storage have not been analyzed. Most important though is 
Lee's conclusion that when storage is possible, optimal emission 
control is not achieved using a time sequence of fixed per-unit 
effluent charges set equal to the marginal social cost of pollution. 
Two problems occur with fixed charges: First, firms undervalue 
storage capacity and may build facilities that are too small because 
they do not capture all of the social benefits from storing pollutants.
1 
Second, and more important, according to Lee's equation (25), which 
describes the optimal sequence of taxes, time intervals [t, 'E'J exist 
such that t2 - -rt I -rt - -rt C(t1)e 1 - a tl e dt = C(t2)e 2 for t s t1 < t2 S E, 
where C(t) is the fixed per-unit effluent charge set equal to the social 
marginal cost of emissions, and a is the unit pollution storage cost. 
According to this equation, the present value cost of emitting a pollu-
tant at time t1 is the same as storing the pollutant for later release 
at time 1:2• The optimal emissions sequence � be induced using charges 
C(t), but an indeterminacy exists in that the firm is indifferent to 
various emission paths, and there is no assurance the socially optimal 
one will be chosen. These indeterminacies arise because of storage 
which allows for the "smoothing" of emission costs over time, such that 
the present value marginal cost of emissions in each period is the same. 
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In general, taxes won't work to control emissions whenever it 
is desirable to release some stock of pollutants gradually over time. 
The discounted emissions costs (including effluent charges), to the 
firm must be the same over time, otherwise all pollutants will be 
discharged in the period with the lowest cost. Consequently, inde-
terminacies exist at the firm level and there is no assurance that 
a time sequence of effluent charges will induce the optimal sequence 
of aggregate emissions. 
In fact, the same indeterminacy arises (as demonstrated 
below) in using effluent charges to achieve� set of emissions. 
Baumol and Oates [1, 2] show, in a static world, that whatever 
the standard of environmental quality the public authority selects, 
effluent charges can realize that standard at the least cost to 
society. But what is the role of the "standards" approach in a 
dynamic world where pollutants can be stored? Because of indetermi-
nacies Pigouvian taxes are ineffective instruments. Can other 
monetary incentives induce desirable effluent controls? 
As an alternative to effluent charges, we consider a system 
where rights entitling firms to emit in each period are sold in a 
competitive market. Total emissions are restricted to an acceptable 
or desirable level each period by limiting the supply of pollution 
rights. Unlike effluent charges, we find this system can produce the 
optimal generation-storage-emission program and prescribed standards 
are realized at least cost. Normally, except for administrative details, 
markets and emission charges act similarly to control pollution. With 
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markets, however, indeterminacy in the total response by all firms is 
eliminated by limiting the number of pollution rights issued. 
A POLLUTION RIGHTS MARKET 
To illustrate this result, consider Lee's model modified to 
allow for several polluting firms. Each firm, j, (j = 1, • • •  J), 
generates and emits an environmental pollutant at the rates g,(t) and 
J 
e. (t) respectively. The social benefit realized from the generation 
J 
of pollution (perhaps in the form of increased production), is assumed 
to be entirely captured by the firm, and is given by B.(g.(t), t). 
] ] 
This function changes over time as abatement technology, product 
demand and production costs vary. Let e(t) = E.e.(t) be aggregate J J 
emissions. Then the social cost of emissions is C(e(t), t) which 
changes over time with variations in population density, environmental 
awareness, seasonal fluctuations in the environment, etc. 
Pollutants may be stored during periods of high social 
emission costs to be released later when costs have decreased. At any 
time, t, the stock of pollutants held by firm j is G.(t) - E.(t) where 
] J 
G.(t)= Jt 
J 0 
g.(T) dT and E,(t) = ft 
] J 0 
ej(T) dT. The variable cost of 
storage given by a.(G.(t) - E.(t)) is proportional to the stock of ] J 
pollutants, where a. > O. There is a total storage capacity, K, for 
the economy provided at a cost H(K) such that 
0 $ E. G.(t) - E E.(t) $ K
] J J (la) 
In present value terms, the net social benefit from the 
generation, storage and emission of a sequence of pollutants for an 
economy with J firms is 
v JT E,{B,(g.(t), t) 
0 J J J 
a.(G. (t) 
J 
JT -rt - H(K) - C(e(t), t) e dt 0 
E. (t)) }e -rtdt 
J 
5 
(2) 
where r is the discount rate. The optimal sequence of generations and 
emissions is obtained by maximizing V with respect to K and the time 
sequences for g, and e. for all j subject to (la) and the constraints. 2 
] ] 
g.(t), e.(t), v j J ] 
G. (T) - E. (T) 
] ] 
o, v j 
(lb) 
(le) 
Note that eq. (la) indicates that firms store pollutants centrally. We 
might have made storage site specific, but this adds nothing substantive 
to the analysis. To eliminate the undervaluation problem and to insure 
adequate storage capacity, we will assume that the optimal capacity is 
publicly provided, perhaps with manditory contributions from firms. 
A description of optimal generation and emissions paths is 
unnecessary as the problem of maximizing V is similar to Lee's analysis. 
Also from Lee we know, effluent fees will not induce optimal abatement 
when storage is possible. Instead, consider a competitive market for 
emission and storage rights. Each period the pollution authority 
limits the supply of emission rights, r(t) to �**(t), the optimal total 
emission level. 3 Thus 
and 
e.(t) � r. (t) for all j, t. 
J J 
L e. (t) $ L r. (t) 2 e**(t) 
j J j J 
where r. (t) is the number of rights held by j at time t. 
J 
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(3a) 
The optimal total storage capacity, K**, is publicly provided. Firms 
can purchase certificates, S. (t) to store pollutants for one period at 
J 
a variable cost, a. Thus, 
and 
G.(t) - E. (t) � S.(t) 
J J J 
L G.(t) - L E. (t) � K
**
j J j J 
(3b) 
Firms receive initial endowments of rights, 
can be traded in the market. 4 Firms choose 
{r. (t)}, and {S. (t)} which 
JO J O 
{g.(t)}, {r.(t)}, {e. (t)} and 
J J J 
{Sj(t)}
5 to maximize discounted profits, which include net sales of 
pollution and storage rights, 
T 
!Ij 
= f 
0 
(B.(g.(t), t) 
J J 
a(G. (t) 
J 
E. (t)) - p(t) (r. (t) - r. (t)) 
J J JO 
- q(t)(S.(t) - S. (t))]e-rtdt 
J J O 
(4) 
subject to (la - le) and (3a - 3b), where p(t) and q(t) are the market 
price of emission and storage rights respectively. 6 
This variation of the Dales (3) pollution rights market 
provides for storage, and incorporates the Baumol and Oates (197 1, 1975) 
7 
"standards approach" to establish total emission rights each period.7 
Here with complete information, standards are set optimally. With 
incomplete information a sequence of "acceptable" standards,
8 
are set. 
A market equilibrium for rights with imposed standards, 
** * * e (t), exists if there are prices {p (t)}, and {q (t)}, generations 
* * {g. (t)}, and emissions {e. (t)} such that 
J J 
* * ** 0 < l: G. (t) - l: E. (t) < K -
j J 
j J -
* * ** 
gj (t), e
j 
(t), K > 0 
* * 
G (T) - E (T) o, 
(generations and emis­
sions are feasible) 
g. *(t), e. *(t), r.*(t), and S. *(t) is the solution to: J J J J 
and 
max {Il
j
} }
(firms maximize profits) 
g
j (
t) ,ej (t) ,rj (t) ,s
j 
(t)
e** Ct) 
* * - z:jej�t)) .:::_ O, p (t) .::_ O 
* - * 
p (t)[e **(t) - 3ej(t)] 
** i< * 
0 
(K - l: S. (t)) > O,q (t) > 0 
j J 
- -
** * * (K 
- l: S.(t)) q (t) = 0 
j J 
(market clearing 
condition) 
(la) 
(lb) 
(le) 
(5) 
(6a) 
(6b) 
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In equilibrium firms maximize profits subject to prices and the emissions 
constraints, and pollution rights and storage rights markets clear. In 
(6) the total rights sold cannot exceed the standards. Whenever there is 
an excess supply of certificates, prices are zero. 
A market equilibrium has the desirable property summarized in 
Proposition 1: If an equilibrium exists satisfying conditions (la-le), 
(5), and (6a-6b) then (a) the resulting generation-storage-emission 
sequence is optimal and (b) along the equilibrium price path, p*(t) 
MC** (t) = dC(e(t) ) /de. (t) .  
J 
Proof: (Part a) We could show directly that the maximizing conditions 
in (1) are identical to the profit maximizing conditions for the 
firm in equilibrium. A more enlightening proof is to show that 
in equilibrium firms maximize aggregate prof its while meeting the 
emissions constraint Le.(t) � e**(t), and that therefore the 
j J 
sequences {e*(t)} and {g*(t)} are optimal. The same proof will apply 
in Proposition 2 to show in equilibrium firms maximize prof its 
while meeting i!!!Y given emissions constraint. 
(i) Rewriting (2) in terms of IT. in (4) we find that V evaluated at 
J 
at prices p*(t) is given by 
v 
T -rt E Tij -f C(l:e.(t),t)e dt . . J J 0 J 
T 
+ f [p*(t) (l:ej(t) - l: r. (t))]e-rtdtj j JO 0 
T 
+ fq*(t)
0 
- H[K] 
(l: S. (t) - l: s. (t) ]e-rt dt
j J JO 
(l') 
Suppo se we know K** and e.**(t) for all j and t. Then, optimal V, 
J 
denoted by V**, is given by 
+ 
** v max {L IT. 
g.(t) , e.(t) , K j J 
J J 
f T -rt q*(t) (L S.(t) - LS . (t))e dt j J j JO 
0 
T 
J -rt + p*(t) (l: e.**(t) - l: r. (t))e dtj J j JO 
0 
- H[K**] 
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(l ") 
where K and e., which are normally control variables, have been replaced 
J 
with their known optimal values. The last two terms in (l") are constant 
when evaluated at L e.**(t) and K**· 
j J 
Thus we can say the controls {g, ** ** ** , e
j 
, K } maximize ¢ = L IT + J j j 
f T q*(t) (L S.(t) - L S. (t) )e-rtdt subject to the constraintsj J j JO 0 
L e. ( t) 
j J 
L e.**(t) and K 
j J 
K** We now need to show that when firms
maximize profits in equilibrium, they also maximize ¢ subject to the 
constraints. 
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(ii) From (5) , firms maximize IT., evaluated at p*(t) and q*(t). J 
At given prices, firm profits are independent of each other, and 
aggregate profits are maximized by maximizing individual profits. 
Thus, {g.*, e.*} maximizes L IT. subject to L e.(t) S e**(t) and J J j J j J 
K = K**· But, {g.*,e.*} maximizes L IT. subject to L e.(t) = J J j J j J 
e**(t) and K = K** as well. From (6b) L S.(t) = K** whenever 
q*(t) > 0.  Thus J T q*(t) 
0 
j J 
[ L  S.(t) - L S. (t)] e-rtdt is also 
j J JO 
maximized in equilibrium, and therefore {g.*, e.*} maximizes L IT. +. J J j J 
T 
J 
0 
q*(t) [ L  S. (t) - L S. ] e -rtdt subject to L e. (t) 
j J JO j J 
and K = K**· 
(iii) From (i) and eq. (l") we have V** max 
gj, ej' k 
L e.**(t) . J J 
¢ + c, 
subject to the constraints, where c is a constant. But (ii) implies 
that the controls {e.*, g.*, k**} maximize ¢ subject to the constraints, J J 
and thus {e.*, g.*, k**} is optimal. J J 
(Part B) Proceed by comparing profit maximizing conditions in equili-
brium with maximization conditions for (2) to verify that p*(t) =MC**(t). 
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Part B of Proposition 1 implies that with both the market and 
the tax system firms pay a price equal to the marginal cost of emissions 
in order to pollute. From the maximization in (5) 
e-rtl p*(t ) - a 1 
tz J -rt -rt e dT = e 2 p*(t2); 
tl 
- < t < < = t _ 1 t2 _ t 
(7) 
whenever the constraints in la and lb are not active. Thus in equili-
brium the discounted cost of emitting a pollutant over [t,t] is the 
same regardless of the sequence of discharges, and firms are indifferent 
to various emission paths. However, there is a subtle but important 
difference between the tax and market system. With taxes, firms choose 
a level of discharges subject to a fixed charge. In the market, total 
discharges are set. Prices are determined that equate the demand for 
and supply of pollution certificates and interminacies are illuminated 
by restricting the supply of certificates each period. 
Realistically, the optimal sequence of emissions cannot be 
computed. The costs of different emission levels at various times and 
the ability of firms to abate and store pollutants are generally unknown. 
Instead, "acceptable" emission levels varying with the severity of 
pollution damage over time could be set. The proof to part (a) of 
Proposition 1 is easily modified to establish. 
Proposition 2: For given emission constraints � ej(t) � e(t)J 
and storage constraints L G  (t) - L E.(t) � K, the generations and 
j j j J 
emissions corresponding to a market equilibrium are efficient; total 
12 
profits are maximized subject to the emission and storage constraint. 
On the other hand, indeterminacies still arise in using fixed 
charges to achieve given emission standards. Taxes inducing firms to 
meet standards exist. 9 However, firms will not necessarily choose the 
desired sequence, since others are equally preferred under the tax program. 
CONCLUSION 
Propositions 1 and 2 imply a pollution rights market and may 
succeed in some circumstances where effluent charges fail to induce 
optimal pollution control. However, market controls have certain 
limitations: 
1. In our analysis, pollution affects only the consuming 
sector. If pollution externalities exist between firms, the 
market will not meet aggregate pollution standards at least cost. 
Firms facing a uniform price for pollution certificates will 
ignore the external effects of emissions on other firms. 
2. Trade in pollution rights may not exist because of 
thinness in markets and high administration and enforcement costs. 
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3.  Only the equilibrium properties of the market have been 
examined. We need to know if and how the market reaches an 
equilibrium, and what the disequilibrium properties of the market 
are. 
The relative advantages of various controls need to be assessed 
before advocating a particular program. In theory, a multi-period 
pollution rights market can induce an optimal or acceptable storage-
emissions plan. And to some extent, market mechanisms already exist in 
some state and federal pollution controls. Certain solid wastes, air-
and water-borne pollutants are controlled by requiring firms to obtain 
discharge licenses. This system could operate as a market for pollution 
rights, having firms bid on a limited supply of licenses. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. With a fixed fee system, firms benefit from storage by temporarily 
avoiding discharge taxes. The tax equals the benefit to society 
from reducing emissions by one more unit. However, marginal benefits 
decrease with greater reductions in emissions so that the firm does 
not capture some of the benefits from infra-marginal reductions. 
Because of this the firm may construct no storage capacity when 
positive capacity is optional. 
2. We arbitrarily impose the terminal storage constraint G. (T) - E. (T) = 0 J J 
for simplicity. 
3. Only total optimal emissions, Le.**(t), and not the emissions for J 
each firm need to be announced. 
4. The authority can change allocations of initial rights { r.  (t)} JO 
and {S. (t)} to affect total profits without changing the firm's JO 
choice of {g,(t)},{e.(t)}. J J 
5. A bracket {•} denotes a time path for a variable. 
6. If r. (t) - r. (t) > (< ) 0, the firm is a net purchaser (seller) of J JO 
pollution rights, with the same convention holding for storage rights. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Note that both a market in emission rights and storage rights 
is needed. Lee shows that when the optimal storage capacity is 
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provided, there will be instances when the storage capacity con-
straint is binding. Thus storage capacity is a scarce good which 
must be allocated optimally like emission rights. Generally, 
multiple controls are needed to achieve multiple objectives, and 
in this case two markets are required to allocate two types of 
goods. For an interesting discussion of the use of policy instru-
ments to achieve multiple goals see Smith and Russell (5) and 
Smith (6). 
See Baumol and Oates (1,2) for a discussion of setting 
"acceptable" standards. 
These taxes equal the market equilibrium prices for certificates. 
In equilibrium, Eq. (7) holds over certain intervals. Thus 
indeterminacies arise as the discounted cost of emitting a 
pollutant is invariant with the sequences of discharges. 
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SYMBOLS 
Cl - "alpha" 
T - "tau" 
1f - "pin 
{} - "brackets" 
